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Abstract. This study explicitly rejects the prima facie proposition that the top-tier investment banks are capable of deliver-
ing supernormal value creation to the shareholders of a REIT acquirer in a corporate acquisition. Using the event study 
method, we find that REIT acquirers advised by market-leading investment banks suffer an average cumulative abnormal 
return of −4.41% following the M&A announcement, whereas REIT acquirers advised by non-top-tier investment banks 
only suffer an average cumulative abnormal return of −1.49%. The evidence shows that the contemporary practice of em-
ploying investment banks based on the prestige of the advisory firms could potentially result in value-destroying M&As 
for the REIT acquirers.
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Introduction
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) have increased in 
size dramatically since their establishment in 1960. US 
REITs had a market capitalisation of only $32bn in 1993 
but this has grown to $1,328bn by 2019, meanwhile the 
number of REITs is little changed from the mid 1990s 
(219 in 2019 compared to 226 in 1994). In the pursuit of 
external growth, efficiency gains and strategic expansion, 
numerous REITs have utilised mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Total M&A deals in the REIT industry recovered 
after the GFC and, as illustrated in Figure 1, reached a new 
record deal value of over $71 billion in 2018.
Given the REIT sector and the companies within it 
have grown so rapidly the role of financial advisors in sup-
porting that growth and in creating value for their REIT 
clients is particularly of interest. A financial advisor should 
ensuring that the advisory services provided are in favour 
of its client’s interest. An investment bank’s reputational 
risk is intensified in a public transaction (Rhee & Valdez, 
2009). On the other hand, the complexity of acquiring a 
private target relies more on the bargaining power and 
deal sourcing capabilities of their advisers, implying a 
need for significant effort from the financial advisors for 
private transactions.
In firms with strong corporate governance in place, 
the strategic decision to employ an M&A financial advisor 
should be driven by the intention to maximise shareholder 
wealth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). A financial advisor rep-
resenting the client in a merger transaction should act in 
the best interests of the firm’s shareholders by negotiating 
better corporate acquisition terms and a lower premium 
while the financial advisor for the target firm should seek 
to increase the deal premium. In an efficient market, the 
extent to which a corporate takeover benefits the share-
holder of the event firm will be instantly reflected in its 
share price during the merger announcement period. If 
top-tier investment banks are able to provide better M&A 
advisory services for their clients, this should be reflected 
in higher abnormal returns of acquirers who are advised 
by leading financial advisors, which, in turn, will help to 
justify the investment bank’s higher advisory fees (Rau, 
2000; Hunter & Jagtiani, 2003). Hence, the question which 
this paper addresses – do top-tier investment banks create 
value for an acquirer firm in an M&A transaction? There 
are contradicting results in the corporate finance litera-
ture concerning the value-enhancing role of the leading 
M&A advisors. As top-tier financial advisors often charge 
a reputation premium when providing advisory services, 
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this raises a doubt whether it is worthwhile for a bidding 
firm to employ these advisors.
This paper contributes to the literature by analysing 
the role of top-tier financial advisors in REIT M&As. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study 
that explicitly addresses the question of the prestige of fi-
nancial advisors on the wealth implication of the REIT 
acquirers. Given that the REIT M&As are dealing with 
real estate assets, the valuation should be easier and there 
should be less complexity than in other corporate M&As. 
Thus REITs might be an area whether top-tier financial 
advisors may struggle to really create wealth for their cli-
ents. REITs have a particular regulatory and institutional 
environment and less flexibility on dividend pay-out 
policy than other corporates. These unique characteris-
tics of REITs, therefore, might result in dissimilar wealth 
implications to the shareholder of REIT firms in M&As 
as postulated by Allen and Sirmans (1987) and Eichholtz 
and Kok (2008). Due to the 90% dividend pay-out require-
ment of U.S. REIT, a considerable proportion of corporate 
takeovers among REIT entities are financed using a mix of 
cash and stock while the mergers that are solely financed 
by internal funds and/or cash are relatively rare. Besides, 
the unique regulatory requirement of REITs such as the 
5-50 rule (the top 5 investors must not account for more 
than 50% of the ownership) also greatly reduces the prob-
ability of a hostile takeover (Campbell et al., 2001; Bauer 
et  al., 2010). This effectively weakens the mechanism to 
discipline incumbent managers with opportunistic rent-
seeking behaviour from engaging in value-destroying cor-
porate agendas (Campbell et al., 2011). Apart from that, 
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) assert that the diversification 
potential of REITs is relatively limited due to the require-
ment to hold no more than 25% of their total assets out-
side of the income-generating property assets.
Using the event study method, we find that leading 
financial advisors, on average, do not enhance the share-
holder wealth of its client firms and that the top-tier in-
vestment banks fail to deliver extraordinary share price 
performance vis-à-vis the bidders which retain a non-
top-tier financial advisor. The REIT acquirers advised by 
market-leading investment banks suffer an average cumu-
lative abnormal return of –4.41%, whereas REIT acquir-
ers advised by non-tip-tier investment banks only suffer 
an average cumulative abnormal return of –1.49%. The 
value-destroying nature of prestigious financial advisors, 
suggests that the signalling effect of an investment bank’s 
reputation capital does not seem to be momentous among 
REIT M&As and that the top-tier investment banks fail 
to render superior financial advisory services to the REIT 
acquirers.
1. Literature review
1.1. Motivation of M&As
The literature on conventional M&As suggests that the 
market for corporate control is driven by the need to pur-
sue economies of scale, market power, synergistic gains as 
well as cost-based efficiency improvement through hori-
zontal and vertical integrations (Manne, 1965; Asquith 
et al., 1983; Brealey et al., 2008). Besides, firms often un-
dertake corporate takeovers in the pursuit of enhanced 
market dominance, competitive advantage, and bargain-
ing power across value chains (Seth, 1990). In accordance 
with the neoclassical theory of M&As, corporate acquisi-
tions should only be undertaken by managers if they are 
perceived as value-enhancing activities which generate 
positive net present value (NPV) for the combined firm. 
However, the value-destroying nature of M&As, evident in 
both the short and long-run negative excess performance 
of the acquirers, seems to suggest that public takeovers, 
to a large extent, fail to create value for the shareholders 
of bidding firms.
















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number of Deals Aggregate Transaction Value ($M)
Figure 1. Number of deals and transaction value of U.S. REIT M&As
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M&A activities in the REIT industry are predomi-
nantly motivated by external growth, economies of scale, 
and an enhanced management efficiency (Allen & Sir-
mans, 1987; Ambrose et al., 2005; Eichholtz & Kok, 2008; 
Glascock et al., 2018). The opportunity to offset the net 
operating losses (NOL) of target firms against the bidders’ 
tax liabilities also results in REITs with large NOL and 
deferred tax assets being an attractive potential target for 
corporate acquisitions (Li et al., 2001). Ling and Petrova 
(2011) discover empirical evidence that the tax advantage 
of acquiring targets with tax-loss carry-forwards prompt 
mergers within the REIT sector. Moreover, Eichholtz and 
Kok’s (2008) study finds that under-performing REITs 
have a higher tendency to become a potential target for 
corporate acquisitions despite the lack of hostile takeover 
within the REIT sector. Their findings are consistent with 
those of Allen and Sirmans (1987) and Womack (2010) on 
the inefficient management hypothesis as an underlying 
driver for consolidations within the listed property sector. 
Thus, the economic gains arising from REIT M&As are 
largely attributed to the synergistic and efficiency motiva-
tions relative to the search for market bargaining power 
and monopolistic ability as observed across public merg-
ers among conventional firms.
1.2. Value creations of M&As
The academic literature has arrived at a consensus that 
merger and acquisitions typically benefit the sharehold-
ers of the target firms substantially while a M&A deal is 
on average merely a break-even endeavour for the bidders 
(Andrade et al., 2001; Bradley et al., 1988; Mitchell & Mul-
herin, 1996). The gain captured by the target firm implies 
the anticipated efficiency gains generated by M&A trans-
actions are disproportionately taken by the target firm. 
This may be due to an excessive acquisition premium be-
ing offered by the bidding firm while some academic stud-
ies also point towards the value-reducing theory of M&A, 
such as the hubris hypothesis as well as the agency theory 
of free cash flows associated with managerial entrench-
ments and empire building (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; Morck et al., 1990).
In the context of the public REITs, the empirical 
findings are generally in line with the earlier studies on 
the value creation of M&As among conventional firms 
whereby a significant value gain is accrued to the target 
firms whilst the acquirers experience an abnormal return 
which is either negative or insignificantly different from 
zero (Allen & Sirmans, 1987; Elayan & Young, 1994; Sa-
hin, 2005). Allen and Sirmans (1987) was the first study 
which analyze the value creation of M&A in the REIT 
industry. They found that the acquirer’s abnormal return 
was significantly positive, albeit their sample size was rela-
tively constrained to 38 REIT mergers before the 1990s. 
However, subsequent studies have consistently shown that 
the abnormal gain attributable to the bidder is either sig-
nificantly negative or indistinguishable from zero (Elayan 
& Young, 1994; Campbell et  al., 2001). It is also worth 
noting that the excess return accrued to both REIT bid-
der and targets are found to be lower than those docu-
mented for conventional M&A firms (Elayan & Young, 
1994). Among recent studies on M&As within the REIT 
sector, the cumulative abnormal return experienced by a 
REIT acquirer ranges from a negative and statistically sig-
nificant return of −1.60% to a positive albeit insignificant 
share price performance of 0.37% (Eichholtz & Kok, 2008; 
Campbell et al., 2011; Womack, 2010). In the long horizon 
post-merger completion, the underperformance of REIT 
acquirers is largely in line with the findings of the corpo-
rate finance literature (Sahin, 2005; Campbell et al., 2007).
The status of the target firm is a key determinant of the 
acquirer’s return. Corporate finance studies have long con-
cluded that the bidders enjoy a non-negative gain in the 
takeover of a private firm while public acquisitions are of-
ten associated with significant negative abnormal returns. 
The positive share price reaction towards the acquisition 
of a private target might be attributed to the liquidity dis-
count argument (Fuller et al., 2002). Consistent with the 
findings of general corporate finance literature, the acqui-
sition of private targets by public REITs has been found 
to higher abnormal returns than the takeover of public 
firms (Campbell et al., 2011). However, the magnitude of 
abnormal returns is also discovered to be smaller for REIT 
firms than those documented in the general corporate fi-
nance literature.
The means of payment also plays an important role 
in shaping the shareholder wealth creation of an M&A 
transaction. Similar to the findings of Travlos (1987) and 
Servaes (1991), the difference in the degree of M&A val-
ue creation among REITs is attributable to the payment 
method during a merger transaction, with cash acquisi-
tions generating the highest abnormal return, followed 
by the use of mixed financing and lastly stock-financed 
mergers (Campbell et al., 2011; Ling & Petrova, 2011). The 
relatively lower wealth creation attributed to the acquirers 
using stock payments is associated with the asymmetric 
information issue and tax considerations. Myers and Ma-
jluf (1984) assert that the negative abnormal return in a 
stock-financed merger stemmed from the negative signal-
ling effect which posits that the bidders’ equity is overval-
ued. As a result of information asymmetry and adverse 
selection, the bidder is penalised by its shareholder when 
acquiring a public target. However, the signalling effect 
is less negative in the takeover of a private target (Eckbo 
et al., 1990). These might be related to the monitoring ef-
fect, as suggested by Chang (1998), in which the formation 
of block holder brought about stronger internal corporate 
governance in a public-private corporate takeover. On 
the other hand, cash-financed acquisitions are often as-
sociated with positive and significant abnormal gains to 
the bidders, regardless of the target status (Travlos, 1987; 
Chang, 1998).
In the context of REIT M&As, it is noteworthy that 
the adverse impact on the use of stock payment is com-
paratively weaker than those of the conventional firms due 
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to the more limited financing methods available to REITs 
given their regulatory constraints (Campbell et al., 2011), 
notably the requirement of a high dividend pay-out which 
results in a low reserve of internal funds and limited cash 
in the business.
1.3. Role of investment banks
The value enhancement role of an investment bank in an 
M&A transaction is predominantly derived from two im-
portant functions: the better merger hypothesis and the 
bargaining power hypothesis (Bowers & Miller, 1990). 
The better merger hypothesis refers to the ability of an 
investment bank to source a potential target that is best 
able to maximise the shareholder wealth of their clients. 
This function draws upon the resources and skills of an 
investment bank to act as an efficient intermediary within 
the financial market (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). The 
bargaining power hypothesis stems from a financial advi-
sor’s role in negotiating the transaction price on behalf of 
the bidding firm. The role of the financial advisor in the 
offer price negotiation phase is an important determinant 
of the magnitude of value gains and synergistic surplus 
attributable to its client firm. Thus, it is reasonable to as-
sume that an investment bank’s competitive advantage 
originates from its expertise and experience in provid-
ing superior M&A advisory services through identifying 
targets which maximise value creation potential without 
overpaying for the acquired firm. This is made possible 
through its economies of scales and scope, analytical ca-
pabilities as well as its track record within the industry.
Bowers and Miller (1990) provide empirical evidence 
supporting the better merger hypothesis. In acquisitions 
where either the acquirer or target employ first-tier invest-
ment banks, the incremental of total shareholder’s wealth 
(acquirer’s shareholder’s wealth plus target shareholder’s 
wealth) is greater than when neither firm employs a first-
tier investment bank. However, as documented in the lit-
erature, most of the benefit of M&As goes to the target’s 
shareholders. Thus, Bowers and Muller (1990) did not find 
evidence that the acquirer’s shareholders benefit from the 
acquirer employing a first-tier investment bank.
A large proportion of advisory fees are only paid to the 
financial advisor upon completion of the merger transac-
tion. Thus, the fee structure creates agency conflict be-
tween the M&A financial advisor and the shareholders of 
the acquirers. This will be exacerbated if the remuneration 
of the investment banker is influence by market share as 
well as fee revenue with an additional incentive to com-
plete the deal. Financial advisors are therefore unlikely to 
be fully aligned with the objective of shareholder value 
maximisation for the bidding firm when they are reward-
ed for completing the deal. Rau (2000) shows that the top-
tier investment banks fail to create value for the acquirer 
firms as they are inherently motivated by deal completion 
above the quality of the transaction. He argues that there 
appear to be two contradicting forces dictating the per-
formance of the financial advisors, namely the superior 
deal hypothesis and the deal completion hypothesis. The 
superior deal hypothesis is that an investment bank’s pres-
tige is signalled through the quality of its work, and thus a 
top-tier investment bank should be capable of delivering 
positive abnormal gains to its client firms. In contrast, the 
deal completion hypothesis advocates that the contractual 
fee agreements for the M&A advisory services prompt the 
financial advisors towards completing deals irrespective 
of the value implications for acquiring firms in order to 
generate fees and increase market share. In a subsequent 
study, Rau and Rodgers (2002) find that the reputable in-
vestment banks are more likely to be hired by acquirers 
with a larger board size and a lower ownership concentra-
tion. However both over short and longer-horizons share 
price performance of the bidder shows unsatisfactory 
results when reputable investment banks are employed. 
They argue that reputable investment banks are hired by 
managers and directors with poorly-aligned incentives 
simply to ensure the deal is completed.
The assertion that the top tier investment banks’ per-
formance in the M&A advisory business fails to live up to 
expectations in terms of the impact on the shareholder’s 
wealth of acquiring firms are supported by other studies. 
For instance, da Silva Rosa et  al. (2004) document the 
underperformance of top-tier investment banks in Aus-
tralia M&A advisory business. Servaes and Zenner (1996) 
and Ismail (2010) discover evidence that the association 
between an investment bank’s prestige and the acquirer’s 
gain surrounding the merger announcement period is 
not significant. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) and Walter 
et al.’s (2008) show that the prestigious financial advisors 
are inherently motivated by the fee structure of the advi-
sory services, thus inevitably giving rise to the conflict of 
interest between the investment firm and its client in an 
M&A transaction. Recent studies by Derrien and Dessaint 
(2018) have also provided justification for the claim that 
the investment banks have a high incentive to focus on 
their position in M&A league tables.
However, there are studies that show a positive rela-
tionship between the reputation of a financial advisor and 
the shareholder’s wealth of acquirers. For instance, Kale 
et al. (2003) claim that it is important to consider the rep-
utation of the advisor of the target, they show that acquir-
ers with better advisors are associated with wealth gain. 
Prior studies investigated the importance of investment 
banks for M&A outcomes by hypothesizing a measure of 
advisor quality, such as market share or brand prestige. 
Such studies will find significant results only if their cho-
sen measures are truly accurate proxies of ability. Instead 
of using a measure of advisors quality, Bao and Edmans 
(2011) employ a fixed-effect analysis, and they find that 
certain banks have the ability to create wealth for their 
clients. Golubov et al. (2012) show that top-tier advisors 
can deliver higher acquirer returns than their non-top-tier 
counterparts in public acquisitions only. The reason is that 
public acquisitions require more skill and lead to greater 
reputational exposure to the advisors. Guo et  al. (2020) 
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argue that the effects of top-tier investment banks depend 
on the financial condition of the acquirer. Top-tier invest-
ment banks improve performance for constrained acquir-
ers rather than neutral, and unconstrained acquirers.
In the REIT sector, the study by Daniels and Phillips 
(2007) portrays the positive relationship between the fi-
nancial advisor’s prestige and the transaction value of 
REIT mergers. They find that top-tier investment banks 
are used for larger transactions. They do not investigate 
the impact on shareholder’s wealth/ share price perfor-
mances. Thus, the effect of top-tier investment banks on 
REIT bidder shareholder wealth of s remain unknown and 
will, therefore, be addressed in this paper.
2. Data
The primary data sources are S&P Global Market Intel-
ligence, Thomson Reuters Eikon and CSRP. The deal 
screener function in the SNL Market Intelligence is used 
to obtain a list of U.S. publicly traded equity REITs that 
have undergone M&A between 1993 and 2019. Thomson 
Reuters Eikon is used to complement the SNL platform 
when data availability issue arises.
Daily returns of REIT acquirers and S&P500 are ob-
tained from CRSP. Firm accounting data including market 
capitalisation, the book value of equity, leverage ratio and 
operating cash flow information of the event firms are re-
trieved from Compustat. The financial advisor league table 
for conventional M&As and the real estate sector M&As 
are downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Eikon M&A 
database.
The initial sample contains a total of 281 M&A of all 
types within the U.S. REIT sector and is subsequently fil-
tered to ensure it is focused on corporate M&A activity 
where the acquirer is a U.S. publicly-traded REITs, there 
is at least one financial advisor for the REIT acquirer and 
share price information is available on CRSP. Purchases 
and disposals of minority interests and properties are ex-
cluded. The final dataset consists of 100 M&A deals initi-
ated by the U.S publicly-traded REITs from 1993 to 2019. 
None of the M&A deals in the sample is hostile in nature. 
This is not perceived as a coincidence given the widely 
documented literature on the lack of hostile M&As within 
the REIT sector (Eichholtz & Kok, 2008; Campbell et al., 
2011).
In this paper, the investment bank’s reputation is prox-
ied using the rank of total transaction values in M&A 
deals. In the spirit of Fang (2005) and Golubov et  al. 
(2012), we use a binary classification in ranking the in-
vestment banks whereby the top-8 firms with the high-
est total transaction value will be classified as the top-tier 
financial advisors while the remaining advisory firms fall 
into the non-top tier category. This is also consistent with 
the Wall Street’s practice of categorising the top 8 invest-
ment banks as the “bulge bracket” firms. When corporate 
takeover among investment banks take place, the new 
combined entity takes credit for the M&A deals conduct-
ed post-acquisition. For instance, when Merrill Lynch & 
Co was acquired by Bank of America in 2009, all merger 
deals thereafter are considered as being advised by Bank 
of America. In the presence of multiple financial advisors 
for a REIT acquirer, the acquisition is regarded as being 
consulted by a top-tier investment bank as long as one or 
more top-tier investment bank is listed as the M&A finan-
cial advisor. These approaches are in line with the prac-
tice of academic studies evaluating the reputation effect 
of financial intermediaries (Bao & Edmans, 2011; Derrien 
& Dessaint, 2018). The ranking used in this study is pre-
sented in Table 11. The top-8 financial advisors identified 
in this paper are Goldman Sachs & Co, Morgan Stanley, JP 
Morgan, Bank of America Securities, Citi, Credit Suisse, 
UBS and Deutsche Bank.
If the top-8 financial advisors are identified as lead-
ing financial advisors, the leading financial advisors for 
M&A activity among conventional firms are almost the 
same from that indicated in the study by Golubov et al. 
(2012), suggesting the consistency of these top-tier invest-
ment banks over a long horizon.2 The rankings are also 
largely identical to the bulge bracket investment banks in 
investment banking industries in other markets across the 
globe.3 Given that the advisory firms specialising in real 
estate M&A business might not share the same expertise 
and reputation as for corporate acquisitions across other 
industries, we investigated whether there are differences 
between the league table for conventional M&As and real 
estate specific M&As. The only difference was that, Credit 
Suisse’s position in the top-8 investment banks category is 
replaced by Barclays. This difference in top-tier classifica-
tion is evaluated in the robustness section.
The descriptive statistics for the whole sample and 
for those advised by the top-tier and non-top tier invest-
ment banks are shown in Table 2. The mean (median) of 
the acquirer REIT’s market capitalization is $4.15 ($1.9) 
billions. REIT acquirers advised by the leading financial 
advisors are associated with the characteristics of having 
a greater size and lower book-to-market value. In terms 
of deal-specific characteristics, it is also obvious that the 
top-tier investment banks are more likely to be employed 
in a merger transaction with a larger deal size. Besides, 
the bulge bracket investment banks are more inclined to-
wards advising public takeovers than the acquisition of 
private targets. Cash-financed mergers and Stock-financed 
mergers comprised of 9% and 36% of the total M&As in 
my sample, respectively. 81% of the acquisitions are public 
targets.
1 Sibilkov and McConnell (2014) provide support for the sta-
tionary feature of the top-tier investment banks’ position 
within the M&A league table across the two decades.
2 The difference between our top-tier investment bank ranking 
and the one indicated by Golubov et  al. (2012) is that UBS 
and Deutsche Bank replace Barclays and Lazard in the top-tier 
category. However, in the robustness check, we also include 
Barclays and Lazard as the top-tier investment bank.
3 See, for example, Gemici and Lai (2019), Lessambo (2019) and 
Liaw (2013).
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Table 1. Investment bank league table by total transaction value (all sectors)
Rank Financial advisors Value ($ m) Number of deals
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 19,572,538.3 9,844
2 Morgan Stanley 16,351,577.9 8,887
3 JP Morgan 15,048,616.9 10,438
4 Bofa Securities Inc 13,602,078.2 8,723
5 Citi 12,087,003.5 8,676
6 Credit Suisse 9,772,108.2 8,933
7 UBS 7,594,945.2 7,310
8 Deutsche Bank 7,191,929.9 6,602
9 Barclays 7,149,264.2 4,382
10 Lazard 6,896,118.2 6,366
11 Rothschild & Co 4,926,516.7 7,099
12 Evercore Partners 3,338,605.3 1,852
13 BNP Paribas SA 2,729,329.5 3,361
14 Nomura 2,685,471.6 4,050
15 Centerview Partners LLC 2,098,141.7 430
16 RBC Capital Markets 1,961,881.1 3,279
17 HSBC Holdings PLC 1,875,281.9 2,266
18 Commerzbank AG 1,545,087.6 1,808
19 Houlihan Lokey 1,385,941.9 5,095
20 NatWest Markets 1,325,470.0 2,556
21 PJT Partners Inc 1,321,772.7 814
22 Macquarie Group 1,299,841.3 2,643
23 Jefferies LLC 1,257,619.5 3,599
24 Greenhill & Co, LLC 1,245,925.2 902
25 Societe Generale 1,241,931.5 1,825
Note: This table presents the financial advisor league table for M&As which is extracted from the Thomson Reuters Eikon M&A database. The number 
of deals and total deal volumes consisted of announced mergers from 1993 to 2019. All investment banks are given credit for the acquisition if multiple 
advisors are being employed by the acquirer/target firm. This table does not differentiate between the advisory services provided to either the acquirer or 
the target firm. The top-8 firms with the highest total deal value are classified as the top-tier financial advisors while the rests fall into the non-top-tier 
category. The rank value is the announced transaction value of an M&A deal and is reported in $ million.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Acquirer characteristics
All sample Top-tier Non-top-tier
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Market cap ($bn) 4.15 1.90 100 4.42 2.01 70 3.53 1.21 30
Book-to-market 656.15 644.16 100 621.74 617.26 70 736.44 696.24 30
Leverage 0.47 0.48 100 0.47 0.47 70 0.46 0.49 30
Cashflow-to-equity 74.70 73.84 100 73.14 71.59 70 78.36 74.84 30
Past stock return 0.15 0.12 100 0.16 0.12 70 0.14 0.12 30
Sigma 0.01 0.01 100 0.01 0.01 70 0.01 0.01 30
Panel B: Deal characteristics
All sample Top-tier Non-top-tier
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Deal value ($bn) 1.83 1.12 100 2.07 1.52 70 1.29 4.78 30
Relative deal size 871.53 560.51 100 931.16 560.51 70 732.38 579.16 30
Public deals 0.81 – 100 0.83 – 70 0.77 – 30
Private deals 0.19 – 100 0.17 – 70 0.23 – 30
All-cash deals 0.09 – 100 0.07 – 70 0.13 – 30
All-stock deals 0.36 – 100 0.40 – 70 0.27 – 30
Mixed-financing deals 0.55 – 100 0.53 – 70 0.60 – 30
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics for acquirer- and deal-specific characteristics. The variable definitions are available in the Appendix. Apart 
from reporting the full sample, this table also reports the partitioned sample involving deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier financial advisors 
separately. The market capitalisation of the acquirer firm and the deal value is reported in $ billon dollars.
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3. Methodology
Short-term event study method, as introduced by Brown 
and Warner (1985), is employed to examine the abnormal 
return of the REIT bidders. The expected returns are cal-
culated using the market model4. Abnormal returns are 
calculated by taking the difference between actual returns 
and expected returns as follows:
( )ˆˆit it i i mt itAR R R= − α +β , (1)
where: ARit is the abnormal return for stock i in day t; Rit 
is the actual return of stock i in day t; ( )ˆˆ i i mt itRα +β  is the 
expected return of stock i in day t; Rmt is the return of the 
market portfolio in day t. The S&P 500 index is utilised as 
a proxy for the market portfolio. ˆ iα  and ˆiβ  are estimated 
based on the estimation period ranges over a (−240, −41) 
interval, spanning a total of 200 trading days.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) will be sub-
sequently calculated by summing up abnormal returns 











where: CARiT is the CAR for stock i for T days of event 
window. We choose a three days event window, 1 day be-
fore announcement date to 1 day after announcement date 
which is represented by (−1, +1). In the robustness section, 
the CAR in alternative event windows of five-day, (−2, +2) 
and eleven-day, (−5, +5) have also been computed.
Cross-sectional regression is employed by testing the 
relationship between advisor reputation and bidder CARs 
as follows:
0 1 2 i i i iCAR top tier X=δ + δ − + δ + ε , (3)
where: top-tier is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1if the financial advisor of the bidder is classified as 
“top-tier”, otherwise 0; Xi is a vector of control variables 
including bidder characteristics and deal characteristics. 
Following the literature, we include payment method 
dummy variables, public status of the target dummy vari-
able, relative size of the deal to the acquirer’s market capi-
talisation, market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio, lev-
erage ratio, cash flows to equity measure of the acquirer, 
past stock return of the acquirer, idiosyncratic volatility of 
the acquirer and year fixed effects.
4. Empirical findings
4.1. Financial advisor reputation and bidder CARs
The CAR of the REIT acquirers is illustrated in Table 3. 
Apart from reporting the CAR of the full sample, this 
4 Campbell et al. (1998), and Kothari and Warner (2007) con-
tend that other model specifications such as CAPM and Fama-
French asset pricing models do not generate significant en-
hancement over the market model in terms of the explanatory 
power and variance of the estimates.
table also reports those of the partitioned sample involv-
ing deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier financial 
advisors. The REIT acquirers experience negative and sta-
tistically significant CAR of –3.53%, which is consistent 
with the academic literature that M&As, on average, do 
not create value for the bidders. The value-destroying na-
ture of M&As in the REIT sector discovered in this study 
is also consistent with the significantly negative abnormal 
gain of the bidding firms documented by Campbell et al. 
(1998, 2007) and Sahin (2005). It is worth noting that the 
average CAR of the acquirers advised by top-tier financial 
advisors is significantly lower than the average CAR of the 
acquirers advised by non-top tier financial advisors.
The cumulative abnormal returns could be easily in-
fluenced by the firm and deal-specific characteristics. For 
instance, while the top-tier investment banks are more 
likely to advise the acquirers with lower book-to-market 
ratio, Dong et al. (2006) find that the book-to-market ra-
tio of a bidder is positively related to its abnormal return 
surrounding merger announcement while Rau (2000) dis-
covers that larger acquirers tend to employ the service of 
prestigious financial advisors. Thus, multivariate regres-
sion analysis has been conducted to distinguish the effect 
of top-tier advisor on bidder CARs under a ceteris-paribus 
condition. To ensure there is no multi-collinearity prob-
lem, correlations among variable are checked5.
Table 4 reports the regression results of Equation (3). 
Column (1) shows the results of the benchmark regres-
sion. The coefficient of top-tier is negative and statisti-
cally significant. The empirical findings indicate that the 
strategic decision to employ a top-tier financial advisor in 
an M&A transaction is associated with a negative impact 
on the shareholder wealth of REIT acquirers. Kale et al. 
(2003) suggest that it is important to control for the qual-
ity of the advisor of the target. In column (2), we also con-
trol for the reputation of the financial advisor employed by 
the target, target top-tier is a dummy variable which takes 
a value of 1 if the financial advisor of the target is classified 
as “top-tier”, otherwise 0. The coefficient of target top-tier 
is insignificant while the coefficient of top-tier remains sig-
nificant and negative.
5 For brevity, the correlation matrix table is not reported.






window CAR CAR CAR CAR
(–1, +1) –3.53%*** –4.41%*** –1.49% –2.92%*
Note: The table presents the CAR of the REIT acquirers, encompassing 
both public and private targets in merger deals during the period 1993 to 
2019. The market model is employed while the estimation period ranges 
over a (−240, −41) interval before the merger announcement. The S&P 
500 Composite Index is utilised as a proxy for market movements. The 
asterisks, ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively.
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top-tier financial advisors in the attempt to safeguard their 
reputational capital. They find that this motivation is absent 
in private takeovers. Hence, we added the interaction term 
between top-tier and private in columns (3). The coefficient 
of Top-tier×private is insignificant, indicating that the ef-
fects of financial advisor reputation on bidder CARs do not 
differ between a public target and a private target.
Regarding other control variables, only the coefficient 
of sigma (idiosyncratic volatility) is significant. Sigma 
represents the uncertainty about the value of the firm, a 
negative coefficient of sigma indicates that the CARs of 
the acquirers are lower for acquirers that are more dif-
ficult to value.
4.2. Robustness checks
4.2.1. Alternative event window and CAR model
As there might be information leakage prior to the ac-
quisition announcement, we apply CAR of the alternative 
event windows of 5-day (−2, +2) as the dependent vari-
able in the cross-sectional multivariate regressions. This 
approach serves as an attempt to fully capture the effect of 
the top-tier financial advisors on REIT M&As in a longer 
test window surrounding the merger announcement. This 
practice is recommended by Fuller et  al. (2002) and Is-
mail (2010) who find that in a small minority of mergers, 
the acquisition announcement is only entirely captured in 
the event firms’ share price on a longer event window. As 
the market model may have low predictive power of the 
expected return, we apply Fama-French 3 factor model to 
calculate the expected returns, and the abnormal returns 
is calculated by deducting the expected returns from the 
actual returns. The Fama-French 3 factors are obtained 
from Kenneth French’s online Data Library.
Table 5 reports the regression results and the results 
are in conformity with our conclusion. As expected, the 
In line with the conventional M&As, the coefficient of 
private is positive and statistically significant. This positive 
excess performance experienced by the bidder when acquir-
ing a target firm with private status could be attributed to 
the liquidity discount proposition as documented by Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004). Golubov et al. (2012) 
discover that while the value enhancement effect of top-
tier investment banks is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero in their full sample, it is nevertheless positive and sta-
tistically significant in public acquisitions. They attributed 
this positive effect to the extraordinary effort presented by 
Table 4. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidder CARs
(1) (2) (3)
CAR CAR CAR
Top-tier –0.030** –0.030* –0.036**
(–2.02) (–1.99) (–2.00)
Target top-tier 0.020 0.022
(1.18) (1.27)




All-cash –0.015 –0.012 –0.012
(–0.68) (–0.52) (–0.52)
All-stock –0.003 –0.001 –0.002
(–0.15) (–0.07) (–0.12)
Market cap 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.92) (0.91) (0.94)
Book-to-market 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.98) (1.27) (1.24)
Relative size –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(–0.92) (–1.18) (–1.24)
Leverage –0.024 –0.017 –0.017
(–0.39) (–0.27) (–0.28)
Cashflows-to-equity –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(–0.99) (–0.81) (–0.78)
Past stock return –0.023 –0.015 –0.018
(–0.44) (–0.28) (–0.34)
Sigma –11.373*** –11.065*** –11.171***
(–3.16) (–3.20) (–3.23)
Intercept 0.122* 0.104 0.101
(1.89) (1.58) (1.47)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 100 100 100
R2 0.573 0.581 0.585
Note: The following table presents the regression analysis of the acquirer 
REITs’ CAR on advisor reputation and bidder- and deal-specific charac-
teristics. The full sample consists of 100 observations from 1993 to 2019. 
The dependent variable is the CAR of acquirers in the three-day event 
window of (−1, +1). The asterisks, ***, ** and * represent the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The t-statistics are reported 
in parentheses.
Table 5. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidder CARs 












Bidder characteristics Controlled Controlled
Deal characteristics Controlled Controlled
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 100 100
R2 0.566 0.535
Note: The following table presents the regression analysis of the acquirer 
REITs’ CAR on advisor reputation and bidder- and deal-specific cha-
racteristics. The full sample consists of 100 observations from 1993 to 
2019. The asterisks, ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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top-tier variable is significantly negative in the multivari-
ate regression using the CAR of the 5-day and CAR using 
Fama-French 3 factor model. The superiority of top-tier 
investment banks is not reflected in their ability to deliver 
higher abnormal gains for their client firms.
4.2.2. Alternative financial advisor rankings
The empirical results on the value-destroying nature of 
leading financial advisors might be sensitive to the clas-
sification of top-tier investment banks. Hence, similar to 
Golubov et al.’s (2012) approach, we identify an alternative 
cut-off point, replacing the use of top-8 firms as top-tier 
to include the top-10 firms while the remaining advisory 
firms fall into the non-top tier category. Furthermore, 
given that the advisory firms specialising in the real estate 
M&A sector might not share the same expertise and repu-
tation among corporate acquisitions across other indus-
tries, we have also explored whether using M&A league 
tables for REIT mergers in lieu of the M&A league tables 
for conventional firms yield similar conclusions.
Table 6 reports the regression results and the results are 
in conformity with our conclusion. The coefficients of top-
tier 10 and top-tier RE are negative and statistically signifi-
cant. It is also economically meaningful, echoing the prop-
osition that the merger deals advised by leading investment 
banks, either in the top-10 classification or the top-8 firms 
within the real estate M&A league table are associated with 
negative announcement-induced performance.
4.2.3. Controlling for self-selection bias
The choice of the financial advisor may not be exoge-
nously determined. As shown in Table 2, REIT acquirers 
advised by the leading financial advisors are associated 
with the characteristics of having a greater size and lower 
book-to-market value, which suggests that the choice of 
the financial advisor may be endogenously determined. 
The choice of the financial advisor is the bidder’s decision 
and a self-selection problem could produce biased estima-
tion of the coefficient of top-tier in Equation (3). Heckman 
(1979) proposes a two-stage estimator to correct for this 
bias. Assume that a firm’s decision of choosing a top-tier 
financial advisor is determined by
i i iTop tier Z u− = δ + ; 
1  0i i iTop tier iff Z u− = δ + > ; (4)
0  0i i iTop tier iff Z u− = δ + ≤ , 
where: Zi is a vector of characteristics that affect the choice 
of a top-tier financial advisor; iu  is the error term of the 
selection equation. When ui and ei are correlated, the esti-
mation of Equation (3) will be biased. To correct for such 
self-selection problem, following the proof of Golubov 
et  al. (2012), Equation (4) is estimated in the first stage 
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 is the 
inverse Mills ratio and the coefficient w will determine 
the effect of advisor reputation on CAR. This model also 
appears in Puri (1996), Gande et al. (1997) Gande et al. 
(1999) and Fang (2005).
Following Golubov et  al. (2012), we should have a 
variable that appears in the first-stage equation and does 
not appear in the second-stage equation, a variable that 
affects the choice of financial advisors but does not affect 
CARs. Following Golubov et al. (2012) and Fang (2005), 
we construct a variable scope to serve such identification 
restriction. The scope variable measures the extent that the 
top-tier financial advisor has served the bidder in the past. 
To construct this variable, we download data on equity 
issues, bond issues, and M&As from SNL Market Intel-
ligence. The scope variable takes a value of 1 if, in the 5 
years prior to the deal, the bidder employed a top-tier fi-
nancial advisor at least once for an equity issue, a bond is-
sue, or an acquisition. It takes a value of 2 if, in the 5 years 
prior to the deal, the bidder employed a top-tier financial 
advisor for two of the three types of transactions. It takes 
Table 6. Cross-sectional regression analysis of bidder CARs 







Bidder characteristics Controlled Controlled
Deal characteristics Controlled Controlled
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
N 100 100
R2 0.580 0.580
Note: The following table presents the regression analysis of the acquirer 
REITs’ CAR on advisor reputation and bidder- and deal-specific charac-
teristics. The full sample consists of 100 observations from 1993 to 2019. 
The dependent variable is the CAR of acquirers in the three-day event 
window of (−1, +1). Top-tier 10 is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of 1 if the investment bank is in the top-10 classification, otherwise 0. 
Top-tier is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the investment 
bank is in the top-8 firms within the real estate M&A league table. The 
asterisks, ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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a value of 3 if, in the 5 years prior to the deal, the bidder 
employed a top-tier financial advisor for all three types of 
transactions. It takes a value of 0 if, in the 5 years prior 
to the deal, the bidder never employed a top-tier financial 
advisor for any of those three types of transactions.
Table 7 presents the results of the self-selection model. 
The coefficient of scope is positive and significant, indi-
cating that scope positively determines the probability of 
choosing a top-tier financial advisor. This is consistent 
with Golubov et al. (2012) and Fang (2005), bidders that 
used the services of top-tier bank in the past are more 
likely to employ a top-tier bank again. The probability of 
choosing a top-tier investment bank is higher if the pay-
ment method is all stock. The probability of choosing a 
top-tier investment bank is negatively related to book to 
market ratio and leverage.
From first-stage estimation, inverse Mills ratio is 
constructed and added as an additional regressor in the 
second-stage estimation. The coefficient of inverse Mills 
ratio is negative and significant. This result reflects self-
selection, which can be interpreted as follows: Certain 
observed and unobserved characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of hiring a top-tier advisor and in turn decrease 
bidder CAR. After controlling self-selection, our conclu-
sion remains the same, the strategic decision to employ a 
top-tier financial advisor in an M&A transaction is associ-
ated with a significantly negative wealth implication to the 
shareholder of REIT acquirers.
Conclusions
This study explicitly rejects the prima facie proposition 
that the top-tier investment banks are capable of deliver-
ing supernormal value creation to the shareholders of a 
REIT acquirer in a corporate acquisition. Using the event 
study method, we find that REIT acquirers advised by 
market-leading investment banks suffer an average cu-
mulative abnormal return of −4.41%, whereas REIT ac-
quirers advised by non-top-tier investment banks only 
suffer an average cumulative abnormal return of –1.49%. 
The leading financial advisors are associated with a lower 
abnormal gain for the bidding firms surrounding the ac-
quisition announcement date. Given the unsatisfactory 
announcement-induced performance of REIT bidders 
that retain a top-tier financial advisor, this paper con-
cludes that the practice of employing investment banks 
based on their prestige or value of transactions done 
appears to lead to value-destroying M&As for the REIT 
acquirers.
Future studies could investigate the possible reasons 
that REIT acquirer employ top-tier advisors. For instance, 
whether top-tier advisors are employed to complete the 
deal. In addition, this study has focussed on the market’s 
reaction to the announcement of a transaction and it may 
be that the market is not efficiently pricing the impact of 
the transaction and that a longer term analysis might find 
that the impact on acquirers advised by top tier firms is 
more positive. Although for this study we have checked 
(but not reported given space restrictions) whether some 
changes in scope (sector differences) lead to different con-
clusions further research could investigate the detail of the 
impact on scope to see if this associated with the use of 
top tier advisers, which might explain the negative impact 
on returns.





























Year fix effects Yes Yes
N 100 100
Pseudo R2 (R2) 0.211 (0.581)
Note: The following table presents the regression result of the self-selec-
tion model. The selection equation is the first-stage estimation, where 
top-tier is the dependent variable. The outcome equation is the second-
-stage estimation, where CAR with three-day event window is the depen-
dent variable. The full sample consists of 100 observations from 1993 to 
2019. The asterisks, ***, ** and * represent the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Appendix
Variable description
Panel A: Dependent variables
Variable Definition
CAR Cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer firms are calculated using the standard market 
model across three different event windows of 3 days (−1, +1), 5 days (−2, +2) and 11 days 
(−5, +5) respectively, with the latter two event windows utilised for robustness purpose. The 
estimation period ranges over a (−240, −41) interval, spanning a total of 200 trading days
Panel B: Bidder characteristics
Market cap The market capitalisation of equity of the bidder 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement
Book-to-market Book value of equity of the acquirer firm in its last financial year prior to the merger over its 
market capitalisation 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement
Leverage Total debt of the acquirer firm over its total book value of assets in the last financial year prior 
to the merger
Cashflows-to-equity Fund from operations (FFO) of the acquirer firm over its market capitalisation 4 weeks prior 
the acquisition announcement
Past stock return Buy-and-hold return of the acquirer firm’s stock over the period beginning 205 days and ending 
6 days prior to the acquisition announcement
Sigma Standard deviation of the acquirer firm’s market-adjusted (adjusted by Fama-French 3 factor 
model) daily return over the period beginning 205 days and ending 6 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement
Panel C: Deal characteristics
Top-tier Dummy variable equals to one if an event firm is advised by either one or multiple financial 
advisors ranked among top-8 in the M&A league table and zero otherwise
All-cash Dummy variable equals to one if the deal consideration is solely cash-financed
All-stock Dummy variable equals to one if the deal consideration is solely stock-financed
Private Dummy variable equals to one if the target is a private firm, as well as not being a publicly 
listed entity and zero otherwise
Deal size Transaction value of a merger as reported in the SNL Global Market Intelligence M&A 
transaction database
Relative deal size Transaction value of a merger over the acquirer’s market capitalisation
